

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P R 111333Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3761

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 RABAT 5495

EXDIS

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD; KUWAIT PASS DOHA

E.O. 11652: GDS

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TAGS: PFOR XF MO

SUBJECT: ARAB SUMMIT: MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW

1. SUMMARY. IN DISCUSSION NOV 8 ABOUT SUMMIT RESULTS, FONMIN LARAKI STRESSED NEED TO ACCEPT REALITY OF PLO IF THERE TO BE CONTINUING PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. HE MAINTAINED THAT SUMMIT HAD PRESERVED ARAB NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY, BUT CURRENT OPPORTUNITY MUST BE SEIZED WITHOUT DELAY. ARABS APPRECIATIVE OF U.S. ROLE, AND HOPED U.S. WOULD NOW HELP BRING ISRAEL AROUND TO ACCEPTING FACT OF PALESTINE. ARABS WANTED TO COME TO TERMS AND STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH COULD STILL BE USEFUL, BUT MAIN EFFORT SHOULD BE CENTERED ON PALESTINE. I REPORT THIS CONVERSATION IN SOME DETAIL, AS LARAKI'S COMMENTS STRIKE ME AS QUITE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STILL MODERATE BUT INCREASINGLY SELF-CONFIDENT MOOD PREVAILING HERE AFTER THE SUMMIT. END SUMMARY.

2. PRIOR TO DEPARTURE NOV 11 FOR UNGA PALESTINE DEBATE, FONMIN LARAKI RECEIVED ME FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS NOV 8, WITH FOCUS ON ARAB SUMMIT AND ITS AFTERMATH. LARAKI BROACHED SUBJECT BY SAYING HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND SURPRISE AFFECTED IN SOME CIRCLES ABOUT SUMMIT'S ENDORSEMENT OF PLO. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD EARNED RIGHT TO ITS ROLE THROUGH PROLONGED MILITANCY, AND DECISIONS OF LAST YEAR'S ALGIERS SUMMIT HAD POINTED IN THE DIRECTION PURSUED FURTHER IN RABAT, LARAKI ASSERTED.

3. AT SAME TIME, NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY HAD BEEN PRESERVED, LARAKI UNDERLINED. PLO WAS ONLY ONE OF FOUR ARAB PARTIES WITH NEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILITY. LARAKI CITED FIVE-POINT PLO-JORDANIAN RESOLUTION (AMMAN 6407) AS EVIDENCE OF PERSISTING FLEXIBILITY. I ACKNOWLEDGED LARAKI'S THRUST, BUT NOTED THAT REAL ISSUE WAS NOT SO MUCH WHO WAS CHARGED WITH NEGOTIATING AS WHAT BECAME OF ANY TERRITORY EVACUATED AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS. IF JORDAN NEGOTIATED AS A TRANSMISSION BELT FOR PLO, I REMARKED, THIS WOULD NOT BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM PLO DOING ITS OWN NEGOTIATING. LARAKI, AGREEING, WENT ON TO STATE THAT ARABS WERE NOW BETTER ORGANIZED AND UNITED TO ACHIEVE RECUPERATION OF THEIR LAND, WHICH THEY SAW AS A SACRED PURPOSE.

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4. A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS EXISTED FOR PRESENT, LARAKI ELABORATED, BUT IT MUST BE SEIZED RIGHT AWAY. DELAY WOULD BRING GROWING DIFFICULTIES AND EVENTUAL GREATER "SACRIFICES". ARABS HAD LEARNED LESSON FROM THEIR PAST INTRANSIGENCE, WHICH HAD RESULTED IN MISSING MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR REASONABLE ARRANGEMENTS AVAILABLE IN TIMES PAST. IT WAS DISTRESSING, LARAKI COMMENTED, THAT ISRAEL NOW REPEATING EARLIER MISTAKE OF ARABS.

5. REALITY OF PLO HAD NOW BEEN ACCEPTED BY ARABS, LARAKI WENT ON. WHEN MOROCCANS HAD SOUGHT INDEPENDENCE FROM FRENCH, LATTER HAD INSISTED THEY WOULD NEVER TALK WITH ISTIQLAL. LATER, IN ALGERIA, THEY HAD SAID THEY WOULD NEVER TALK TO FLN. NEVERTHELESS, THEY HAD FINALLY HAD TO FACE REALITY AND DEAL WITH THESE REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS. A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WOULD SIMILARLY REQUIRE DEALING WITH REALITY OF PLO.

6. TURNING TO U.S., LARAKI SAID ARABS RECOGNIZED AND APPRECIATED POSITIVE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ARAB WORLD. LARAKI FELT THAT INVITATION OF PLO TO UNGA PALESTINE DEBATE HAD COME ABOUT WITH U.S. TOLERATION, AMOUNTING IN PRACTICE TO HELP; U.S. TACTICS ON THIS ISSUE AND REASONS BEHIND THEM WERE UNDERSTOOD. I WONDERED WHETHER PLO ALSO SHARED SUCH UNDERSTANDING. LARAKI REPLIED THIS "MORE DIFFICULT", BUT MOROCCANS HAD TALKED TO PLO ON SUBJECT AND BELIEVED PLO'S UNDERSTANDING HAD IN FACT PROGRESSED. PLO WAS NOT HOSTILE TO U.S. PEACE-MAKING ROLE, AND HAD NOT MADE MUCH OF U.S. NEGATIVE VOTE ON PLO INVITATION TO UN, LARAKI REPORTED.

7. TIME HAD NOW COME TO TACKLE PROBLEM OF ISRAEL, LARAKI CONTINUED. KING HASSAN HAD BEEN ARCHITECT OF FIRM BUT MODERATE ARAB OPINION. KING HAD REALIZED, AS U.S. SHOULD ALSO, THAT CONTINUED INFLEXIBILITY ON PART OF ISRAEL WOULD ENDANGER STABILITY OF WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER AS WELL AS WORLD PEACE. ARABS REGARDED JUST MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION AS MORAL ISSUE, LARAKI STATED WITH FEELING. U.S. HAD GONE THROUGH WATERGATE TRAUMA FOR MORAL REASONS--AND WHOLE WORLD TOOK OFF ITS HAT TO U.S. FOR THIS. U.S. MUST THEREFORE BE SENSITIVE TO MORAL ISSUES ELSEWHERE. TIME HAD COME TO
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ACT, HE REITERATED, AND QUICKLY.

8. I ASKED WHETHER LARAKI IMPLYING THAT STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO SETTLEMENT HAD LOST SOME OF ITS VALIDITY. LARAKI REPLIED THAT, IF EGYPT AGREEABLE, FURTHER DISENGAGEMENT IN SINAI ENTIRELY POSSIBLE. PLO WOULD PROBABLY GO ALONG WITH IT. U.S. MUST UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, LARAKI UNDERLINED, THAT SUCH LIMITED STEPS WERE PERIPHERAL. THEY SERVED USEFUL PURPOSE BY KEEPING UP AN APPEARANCE OF MOMENTUM, BUT BASIC ISSUE WAS PALESTINE, HE ARGUED.
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 063234

P R 111333Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3762

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 RABAT 5495

EXDIS

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD; KUWAIT PASS DOHA

9. I INQUIRED HOW KING SAW RESULTS OF SUMMIT. LARAKI

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SAID KING WAS ANXIOUS TO TELL ME HIMSELF. KING HAD REALLY MEANT IT WHEN HE HAD CHARACTERIZED RABAT CONFERENCE AS SUMMIT OF "SERENITY"--THIS WAS NOT JUST A SLOGAN. LARAKI ALSO STRESSED SIGNIFICANCE OF KING'S STATEMENT THAT 1967 KHARTOUM SUMMIT DECISIONS WERE DEAD. WITHOUT A PALESTINE STATE ENJOYING DIGNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, LARAKI INSISTED, NO REAL PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. FOCUS SHOULD THEREFORE BE ON OBJECTIVE OF PALESTINIAN STATE, AND SIDE ISSUES OR CIRCUITOUS METHODS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CLOUD THIS MAIN ISSUE. RABAT SUMMIT HAD FURTHERED CHANCES FOR REAL NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH PERIPHERAL MOVES MIGHT STILL HAVE SOME TACTICAL VALUE. PLO (PALESTINE) HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED AS A STATE, LARAKI URGED, JUST AS ISRAEL HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED AS A STATE.

10. WHILE PLO MIGHT CURRENTLY BE SPEAKING WITH VOICE OF REASON AND MODERATION, WHAT RELIANCE COULD BE PLACED ON SUCH PRONOUNCEMENTS, I ASKED. KING COULD ELUCIDATE FURTHER, LARAKI INDICATED, BUT KING AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS HAD MADE PLAIN TO ARAFAT THAT HE MUST ACT IN STATESMANLIKE MANNER IF HE WANTED THEIR CONTINUED COMBINED SUPPORT. ARAFAT HAD INDEED ALREADY COME TO THIS CONCLUSION HIMSELF, LARAKI SURMISED. AS TO DISSIDENT PALESTINIANS, THEY MIGHT MAKE NOISE, BUT "REJECTIONISTS" AMOUNTED TO ONLY 24 OUT OF 240-MAN PALESTINIAN ASSEMBLY, LARAKI CALCULATED. MOROCCANS HAD MADE CLEAR TO PALESTINIANS THAT ATTACKS ON EMBASSIES, DIPLOMATS, AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE QUALIFIED WITHOUT HESITATION AS ACTS OF TERRORISM. IF PALESTINIANS ATTACKED TARGETS WITHIN ISRAEL, HOWEVER, THAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED PART OF JUST NATIONAL STRUGGLE.

11. I EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT AT KING HUSSEIN'S APPARENT EASY SURRENDER TO PLO DEMANDS. LARAKI RESPONDED THAT HUSSEIN HAD SEEN REALITY. ARAB LEADERS HAD BEEN DETERMINED THERE MUST BE UNITED FRONT, WHICH COULD ONLY BE FORMED AROUND PLO. AT SAME TIME, JORDAN WOULD PLAY FULL, RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN COMMON ARAB STRATEGY. JORDANIAN VIEWS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT; JORDAN'S BORDER WITH ISRAEL WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT EVEN IF PALESTINIANS REGAINED WEST BANK. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE UNREALISTIC NOT TO COUNT JORDAN AS FULL-FLEDGED MEMBER OF CONFRONTATION
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GROUP.

12. ARABS HAD LEARNED MUCH SINCE 1947, LARAKI SUMMED UP. MANY OPPORTUNITIES HAD BEEN MISSED IN TIMES OF HUMILIATION. ARABS NOW WANTED TO COME TO TERMS, AND PALESTINE WAS

ESSENTIAL PART OF THE TERMS. U.S. COULD PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE
ROLE IN HELPING ISRAEL ACCEPT FACT OF PALESTINE, JUST AS
MODERATE ARAB LEADERS HAD HELPED PALESTINIANS COME TO GRIPS
WITH FACT OF ISRAEL. AT UN, THERE MUST BE MOVE AWAY FROM
TREATING PALESTINIANS AS REFUGEES. ARAB WORLD AND U.S.
HAD COMMON INTERESTS, MUST BOTH FIX EYES ON ESSENTIALS,
AND AVOID BEING DETERRED BY OFTEN EPHEMERAL EMOTIONALISM,
LARAKI CONCLUDED.
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